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Developing a "Sense of Community"

U.S. Cultural Diplomacy and the Place of Africa during the Early Cold War Period, 1953–64

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Introduction: African Independence Movements and the Beloved Community

"Americans killed Patrice Lumumba" proclaimed the headlines in Cairo, Egypt, early in 1961.[1] In response, U.S. State Department foreign service officer Zygmunt Nagorski assembled United States Information Service (USIS) personnel at the U.S. embassy in Cairo to develop a factual pamphlet using the text of speeches made by the secretary-general of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld. The pamphlet also included remarks from the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, and President John F. Kennedy. The publication, titled *The Truth about Congo* rolled off the presses and became the official response of USIS offices to the crisis in the Congo. The response of U.S. State Department foreign service officers and USIS personnel reflected a united effort in terms of activities aimed at influencing public perceptions and public attitudes in foreign countries in support of U.S. policies. Using the written word to influence mass attitudes on the controversial circumstances of Lumumba's death served the short-term and long-range U.S. strategic goals, which were to counter negative information and reinforce a favorable impression of the United States.[2]

The United States' provision of information, propaganda, and cultural activities has been a neglected area in the scholarship on U.S. foreign relations with Africa. The use of propaganda (white, true information; gray, distortion of the truth; and black, disinformation) encompassed a "range of information and psychological activities (such as films, news stories and broadcasts)" that purported to explain American foreign policies to non-Americans.[3] This brand of diplomacy joined with indirect methods involving cultural activities to profoundly

shape U.S. cultural diplomacy during the early Cold War period. Through its information agency, the United States engaged in cultural diplomacy as a means of expressing and projecting its national identity abroad by seeking to build bridges and establish community with other nations. The early twentieth-century philosopher Josiah Royce proposed that a "community can only exist where individual members are in communication with one another so that there is, to some extent and in some relevant respect, a congruence of feeling, thought, and will among them." The ideal community, according to Royce, was the "Beloved Community," in which all members pursued the "cause of loyalty, truth, and reality."[4] One of the most complex and perplexing questions is that of ordering truth and reality within the total historical development of the Cold War. America's perceptions of truth and reality became instruments of cultural diplomacy and served to complement the high politics of power and security throughout the Cold War. The diffusion of truth, reality, and ideological loyalty by the exporter of cultural values to the recipient undergirded this form of diplomacy and formed the central feature of U.S. information, propaganda, and cultural programs. These programs served as a cultural matrix for expanding U.S. activities on the African continent.[5]

Propagating American ideas, images, and beliefs, and representations of American political values abroad played a significant role in the strategy used by the United States to enforce its conception of international order. The national ideals and values of America, which emphasized democracy, free enterprise, and freedom, were an integral part of the Cold War strategy designed to persuade, influence, and exert a measure of control over nonaligned countries. The promulgation of National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), issued on April 14, 1950, inaugurated military and economic policies designed to contain the spread of Communism; also, as Emily Rosenberg has argued in *Spreading the American Dream*, NSC-68 inaugurated polices to protect, preserve, and expand American values. Cultural diplomacy, a major subsection of public diplomacy, refers to "the use of culture and cultural tools by governments for the purpose of influencing and conducting foreign relations in a positive manner between peoples and nations."[6] The United States Information Agency (USIA), referred to overseas as the United States Information Service (USIS), implemented myriad cultural programs to transmit American political and cultural values abroad from 1953, the year of the agency's founding, through 1999, when the USIA merged with the U.S. Department of State. As an agency of the executive branch, the USIA advised the president, diplomatic personnel, executive independent departments, and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for current and contemplated U.S. policies, programs, and official statements. To accomplish its goals, the agency conducted a variety of activities overseas. These activities included educational exchanges, international radio broadcasts, and television broadcasts. Additionally, by exporting

American literature, jazz, painting, sports, sculpture, and Hollywood films to the USIS resource centers overseas, the United States facilitated linkages between American and foreign nongovernmental institutions.[7]

President Lyndon B. Johnson advanced the position of establishing linkages and community with African nations in his 1963 address on Africa. President Johnson stated, "We in the United States are dedicated to the same goals as the people of Africa—justice, freedom, and peace. We want to help build a world in which all men have a better opportunity to improve their lives, both spiritually and materially. Thus, we will continue to press for equal rights for all—both in my country and abroad."[8] Concomitantly, the U.S. State Department in its analysis of the independence movements in Africa asserted that "it is also in the U.S. interest to seek the evolution of a sense of community between the United States and Africa, to develop that kind of racial relationship which will enhance our own influence and head off international confrontations and hostile alignments on a racial basis. This is of major importance because of the implications of the racial confrontation in Africa and the deep African interest in the US civil rights struggle."[9] It was during the American civil rights movement that Dr. Martin Luther King employed the concept of the "Beloved Community" to delineate the creation of an American society where the ideals of justice, freedom, and peace would serve as a bridge uniting a divided nation. The idea of establishing a "Beloved Community" extended into the realm of foreign policy as a political strategy used by the USIA and the U.S. State Department to establish community with African nations.[10]

In this chapter, I examine the instruments developed by the United States to influence African nations by exporting American civic culture and American identity in order to establish community with African nations. My analysis relies primarily upon records from the USIA's historical collection, the U.S. State Department's historical reports, and selected records from the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs. My research concentrates on the critical period from 1953 to 1964 when U.S. information, propaganda, and cultural activities became central to U.S. foreign policy. Drawing from the sources listed above, I first discuss the political context for the information, propaganda, and cultural activities in Africa, then examine the five critical information, propaganda, and cultural programs: the Voice of America (VOA), USIS publications in Africa, the English Language Teaching Program, educational exchange, and cultural exchange programs.

African Contexts: Cultural Diplomacy, African Independence, and the Cold War

During the early phase of the Cold War, the United States, through the Mutual Security Act of 1951, provided technical and economic assistance

aimed at influencing "promising and receptive" independent African countries.[11] In North Africa, Libya gained its independence in 1951, and was followed by Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia in 1956. By 1958, two sub-Saharan African nations, Ghana and Guinea, had gained their independence. Amidst the optimism and exuberance of African independence movements there loomed the question of whether to support the East or the West in the bipolar world of the Cold War. As the number of African nations increased steadily, reaching seventeen by 1961, the United States augmented its technical aid and economic assistance initiatives by inaugurating cultural relations with the newly emerging independent, politically nonaligned countries in Africa, as part of its propaganda efforts and intelligence activities designed to thwart the influence of the Soviet Union (USSR) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the African continent.[12]

Africa represented one of several territorial proving grounds in Sino-Soviet Cold War strategies. The USSR and the PRC both developed military assistance programs in East Africa and West Africa and both established an economic presence in several key African countries. The USSR had hoped to establish long-term assets in Africa and by the early 1960s established economic cooperation agreements (often involving credits) with twelve African countries, which included Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Tanzania. The Chinese Communists had established an economic presence in Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Congo-Brazzaville, Tanzania, Zambia, and to a lesser extent Algeria. Disagreement on the position the USSR and the PRC would occupy in the Communist world led to a formal Sino-Soviet split by 1962. The acrimonious ideological tensions between the USSR and the PRC served to sharpen each country's interest in Africa.[13]

The activities of both the USSR and the PRC in Africa shaped the character of U.S. relations with the continent. In an effort to meet the various political realities that had emerged with independence, the United States customized its policies toward the independent nations in Africa. By considering the cultural and social system of each country in formulating cultural relations, the United States sought to regionalize its influence in order to ensure its effectiveness. In most of the former French territories, historic relationships and the French capacity to provide substantial economic and other assistance made France the primary natural source of political and cultural ideas. Thus, the U.S. missions in French West and West-Central Africa were limited to establishing an American presence, engaging in small technical assistance programs, and engaging in what the State Department termed "educative diplomacy" through the English Language Teaching Program. In Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, and Cameroon, the United States also provided bilateral aid in an effort to gain a measure of influence and leverage; however, both France and the European Economic Community (EEC) effectively limited U.S. trade agreements in order to protect French uranium, manganese, and iron ore interests, particularly in Gabon.[14]

In comparison, the situation in the former British territories produced an immersive response. A psychologically weakened Britain started to withdraw from its worldwide commitments, while at the same time the former British territories displayed an inclination to limit British influence. U.S. policy with regard to Britain's former colonies consisted of providing economic aid to the greatest extent that was feasible. To counter the Soviet presence, particularly in Ghana, where Kwame Nkrumah's relationship with Communist leaders stirred U.S. tensions, the United States provided financial and technical support to the Volta River Project. By the early 1960s, U.S. assistance to independent African countries was fairly substantial. Net obligations and loan authorizations in the economic and assistance fields for the fiscal year 1963 amounted to $473.2 million. This assistance consisted of Agency for International Development (AID) technical assistance, Food for Freedom, Export-Import Bank loans, and other programs such as the Peace Corps. U.S. assistance programs were primarily bilateral and aimed at long-range defense against Communist penetration. Economic assistance served other fundamental U.S. objectives such as providing an opportunity to introduce American values, institutions, people, and ideas.[15]

The independence movements in Africa produced a determination among African states to pursue independent foreign policies. Widening their trading links and diversifying their sources of foreign aid away from the former colonial powers conferred diplomatic legitimacy in relation to their power and position. However weak their bargaining power may have been, freedom from foreign domination directed the multilateral initiatives of African leaders, many of whom opposed direct Western influence on the continent. Leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Sékou Touré, Kenneth Kaunda, and Julius Nyerere keenly assessed the political, economic, and social exigencies of the time and developed creative strategies in order to effectively negotiate with the USSR, the PRC, and the United States. Because of the ideological bipolarity of the post–World War II period, the United States viewed the advance of socialism in Africa as inimical to its economic and political interests. However, as William Tordoff has argued, "socialism was a loose concept in Africa and subject to varying interpretations."[16] African socialism reinforced communal traditions and communal identities and, in this context, differed from the socialist developments in the USSR and the PRC. Only a small number of African leaders were orthodox Marxists and even these leaders rejected key tenets of Marxist orthodoxy, such as the class struggle. African leaders adapted Marxist and other ideas to serve African conditions. The interests of leaders such as Julius Nyerere and Modibo Keita in socialism were accompanied by an affirmation of traditional African values.[17]

The strategic importance of Africa to U.S. foreign policy during the late 1950s is reflected in three areas: (1) statements in the USIA's "Third Report to Congress"; (2) President Dwight Eisenhower's Committee on Information Activities Abroad, also known as the Sprague Committee; and (3) statements by the U.S. Department of State's foreign policy analysts. In the USIA's "Third Report to Congress" (1954), the first director of the agency, Theodore Streibert, underscored the importance of "counteracting bad impressions created in [African] countries by American racial violence."[18] The report noted that USIS personnel in Africa concentrated heavily on combating Soviet propaganda on American racial injustice. Extensive coverage of the antisegregation decision of the U.S. Supreme Court was followed by news reports on the progress of desegregation in the United States and by a series of reports about eminent African Americans.[19]

In addition, the Sprague Committee in its analysis of political developments in Africa recommended drastically increasing information activities there to meet the demands of the changing times. In this context, Eisenhower's contention that the "battlegrounds of the Cold War had shifted to the economic and propaganda fields" reinforced the growing importance of Africa in Cold War politics. The ideological conflict between the United States and the USSR was a "total cold war" in which "trade, economic development, military power, arts, science, education, [and] the whole world of ideas [were] harnessed."[20] The National Security Council's Operations Coordinating Board, which developed the U.S. Ideological Program, underscored the warlike character of the Cold War by asserting that the United States "would use every opportunity to make clear to other peoples how the application of free world principles in their societies will work to their advantage and how the adoption of Communist principles will be to their detriment."[21]

With much of Asia lost to the West, Africa represented an important frontier in containing the spread of Communism. Discouraging trade agreements that tied the African economies too closely to the Soviet bloc became an integral component of U.S. foreign policy. In their assessment of African-USSR relations in 1959, foreign policy analysts in the Department of State postulated that "the loss of Africa to the Soviet Union would weaken capitalism in Europe."[22] Supporting the European metropoles and their former colonies with economic aid and technical assistance in order to negate Soviet influence became a policy objective of the United States. The United States not only recognized the centrality of African mineral resources and raw materials to the European economy, but also, in its official policy statements, integrated Africa into the American "mission" and program of cultural relations to counter the ignominy of southern resistance to the civil rights movement.[23]

U.S. strategic and economic interests on the African continent gained greater prominence during the 1960s. Economically, the United States

sought to maintain access to the mineral and agricultural products of Africa, particularly rubber, uranium, bauxite, and copper, which were essential to the American economy and to American defense industries. The space age heightened the strategic importance of Africa. The National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) maintained key facilities in the Malagasy Republic and southern Africa; and the trajectory for testing missiles from NASA's Cape Kennedy, Florida, space center ended near the tip of southern Africa.[24]

However, presenting a positive image of American culture to African nations and expanding American values to Africans was problematic for the USIA due to the persistence of racial discrimination and racial segregation in America. The Soviet Union's persistent coverage of racial incidents in America, particularly the Little Rock, Arkansas, desegregation crisis and the affront to Ghana's finance minister, Komla A. Gbedemah, who was refused service at a Howard Johnson's restaurant in Dover, Delaware, in 1957, underscored the problems faced by the agency in enhancing American credibility in Africa. Race relations in America had reached a critical turning point in the early 1960s. As civil rights activists and proponents of segregation collided in Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia from 1961 to 1963, the international media questioned the authenticity of American democracy. The USSR, in particular, presented lynchings, school segregation, voting rights abuses, and antimiscegenation laws very effectively in its anti-American propaganda.[25]

Under the direction of USIA Director George V. Allen (1957–60), the USIA trimmed its Western European activities and appropriated more resources to cultural programming in Africa. The agency appropriated 35.4 percent of its $110 million budget for the fiscal year 1959 to its operations in Africa, compared with 11.5 percent to the Near East and South Asia; 10 percent to Eastern Europe; 5.5 percent to Latin America; and 1.6 percent to the Far East. Congress assigned 36 percent to Western Europe.[26] With the exception of Africa and Western Europe, USIA appropriations for cultural programming in all regions had been heavily reduced. In this context, Vice President Richard Nixon, following his return from an African state tour, reported to President Eisenhower that "funds for the information program in Africa should be substantially increased over the present level."[27]

Official visits to Africa underscored America's need to assess its informational activities. In December 1959, President Eisenhower visited Tunisia and Morocco, where he argued against "precipitate action" in granting independence to African nations. Eisenhower's cautious approach waned as African liberation movements intensified. Rapid social and political change in both the United States and Africa led to visits in 1961 by G. Mennen Williams, President John F. Kennedy's assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and the USIA director, Edward R. Murrow, in 1962. These visits

Fig. 7.1: President and Mrs. Eisenhower with His Excellency Sekou Toure, President of the Republic of Guinea, and Mrs. Toure in the White House, October 26, 1959. Source: RG 306, Records of the United States Information Agency, Photo Number PS-A-59-15292, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

exemplified American interest in the process of nation building, as the number of independent African nations increased to thirty-four by 1964. Presidential identification with the independent nations of Africa also encouraged diplomatic visits to Washington, particularly during President Kennedy's administration, when twenty-eight African leaders visited America.[28] (See figures 7.1–7.3.)

One of the earliest USIA programs, the Voice of America (VOA), became an essential tool of U.S. foreign policy in Africa, beginning direct broadcasts to sub-Saharan Africa in 1956. Prior to 1956, VOA programs had been confined to the Arabic-speaking population of North Africa. The first fifteen-minute English news broadcast, "Report from America," began in 1957. The following year, the VOA English Service news broadcast to Africa expanded to thirty minutes in length and seven days a week and included new programming. By expanding its coverage and programming, the USIA sought to build its audience by implementing programs of interest to Africans and influencing African nations' perception of American policies, ideas, and culture. VOA news topics included science, medicine, and agriculture.

Fig. 7.2: President Eisenhower greets Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana at the White House, July 24, 1958. Source: RG 306, Records of the United States Information Agency, Photo Number PS-A-58-13073, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

Additionally, the VOA featured special-focus topics on American history, women's activities, and education. The addition of two new broadcasting facilities enhanced the VOA's reception in Africa. In 1963, the USIA completed a 4.8 million–watt transmitter complex in Greenville, North Carolina, which became the most powerful long-range international broadcasting station in the world. In 1964, the agency constructed a transmitter relay complex of 1.6 million watts in Liberia that supplanted the Greenville relay station in Africa.[29]

Fig. 7.3: Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, (third from left) in Nairobi, Kenya with Jomo Kenyatta, Minister of State for Constitutional Affairs (far right), and Richard B. Freund, American Consul General, and Ronald Ngala, Minister of State for Constitutional Affairs and Administration, 1962. Source: RG 306 Records of the United States Information Agency, Photo Number PS-A-62-2912, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

During the 1960s, the USIA diversified its cultural offerings in Africa through the development of more cohesive information programs. These programs expanded the ideological attack on the Soviet system through exploitation of the print media. The mass dissemination of information and

propaganda in Africa was facilitated by the establishment of forty-eight libraries and twelve reading rooms in major cities by 1964. The print media used to carry the USIA message consisted of several notable publications that provided extensive coverage of African politics and visits of African leaders to the United States Additionally, coverage of the progress of civil rights in America, America's commitment to "peace and justice," and both African American and African athletic successes stressed harmony with African interests and U.S. identification with the process of nation building. The USIS produced *Topic, American Outlook,* and *American Perspectives* for African audiences in Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Tanzania. In these publications, American concepts of truth, reality, and loyalty to democratic-capitalist systems were sententiously expressed. The publication in French of *American Outlook* and *American Perspectives,* which began after 1960, expanded America's cultural reach into French West Africa and West-Central Africa during a pivotal period in the region, which witnessed the death of Patrice Lumumba and the secession of the Katanga province of the Congo. The city of Kinshasa, formerly Léopoldville, served as the cultural nexus for the production and distribution of USIS publications to French-speaking Africa regarding U.S. official policy on this crisis.[30]

The use of African languages in USIA publications, as well as in VOA broadcasts, began during the directorship of Edward R. Murrow (1961–64) and reflected a greater emphasis on the centrality of African languages to USIA programming. In addition to expanding VOA broadcasts in French, the USIA also implemented the use of Swahili, Hausa, Amharic, Igbo, and Yoruba in VOA programming. This new programming reflected the agency's strategy of targeting significant geographic regions and populations with programs highlighting African political developments, which were used on the English-to-Africa program *Voice of Africa.* By 1964, VOA programming had expanded to include several music, news, and reporters' roundup shows such as *Jazz Club USA,* African Panorama, *Africana,* and *Space and Man.*[31]

One contentious matter relating to USIS programs in Africa concerned the social level of the population that the information program should target. The question of whether to try to target and seek the support and sympathy of the elite or the masses represented a "dual of dialectics" during the tenure of Edward R. Murrow and Carl T. Rowan. USIS publications displayed self-conscious Americana designed to appeal to both the elites and the masses. In the area of USIS motion pictures, subsidized commercial newsreels, publicizing the activities of Africans in the United States, the activities of Americans in Africa, and self-help projects in African communities, served as collateral support for the same goal, that of reaching the masses and the elites simultaneously. In 1965, the USIA film list for Africa included *Africa in the Age of Independence, African Students Leave Bulgaria, Eisenhower Visits Morocco, President Sékou Touré Visits the U.S.,* and *Congolese Parliamentarians Visit*

Rural America. According to Carl Rowan (1964–65), the first African American director of the USIA, by 1964 *Africa Today* was seen by 30 million Africans each month in 746 theaters. This figure may well have been an exaggeration, since USIS posts reported technical and psychological difficulties with mass viewings of USIA films.[32]

The VOA was one of three international radio broadcasting tools that competed for audiences in Africa. By 1964, both the USSR and the PRC established effective broadcasting in Africa. In 1962, Communist broadcasts to Africa increased by 50 percent, and in that same year, the USSR's broadcasts introduced Bambara, spoken by nearly 3 million Africans in West Africa. Communist radio programming is said to have increased from 298 hours biweekly in 1962 to 332 hours biweekly at the end of 1963. Effective broadcasting in Africa was facilitated by the spread of transistor radios, which multiplied the number of listeners to U.S., USSR, and PRC radio broadcasts. By 1967, the USIA estimated that 4.3 million transistor radios were used in Africa.[33]

Explaining and advocating U.S. policies in credible and meaningful terms led to the implementation of the English Language Teaching program in non-English-speaking regions. In 1960 the USIA contracted with English Language Services, Inc. (ELS), to establish the first English language program in the Republic of Guinea. The ELS contract team in conjunction with the government of the Republic of Guinea conducted courses in English and provided teacher training through the establishment of an exchange program with American University, Georgetown University, and the University of Michigan. Sékou Touré's support of Communist positions in the United Nations initially limited the amount of aid the United States extended to Guinea. However, by 1962, U.S. economic interests in Guinea had grown, partly as a result of Olin-Mathieson's $61 million investment in FRIA, an international consortium operating a bauxite aluminum plant at Kimba, Guinea.[34] The USIA established similar English language teaching programs throughout West Africa and West-Central Africa from 1960 to 1965, and over the course of four years the USIA appropriated from $250,000 to as much as $500,000 to English language dissemination in the independent nations of West Africa and West-Central Africa. As one of several aggressive strategies that masked deeper truths about the realities of Cold War politics, the English Language Teaching Program served as a conduit for promoting American history, life, and culture.[35]

The effectiveness of the English Language Teaching Program, however, must be measured against the fact that African participants continually exploited cultural ties with the United States to fulfill their individual and collective objectives. The vast majority of Africans favored higher education in Europe because of cultural and institutional ties with former colonial powers. Prior to the implementation of educational and cultural programs targeting

African students and teachers, American institutions had not readily welcomed African students, and this constituted one of the major factors in the disparagement of American education by Africans. American-educated African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah and Nnamdi Azikiwe, who emerged during the struggles for independence, graduated from historically black Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, and experienced at first hand the indignity of racial discrimination in America. Both leaders, however, emerged as the "voice of the new Africa" with educational and cultural linkages to African American institutions. This fact informed the increased affinity of these institutions with Africa and African struggles for independence and represented an expanding interest in influencing American policies toward Africa. In this context, the African American Institute (AAI), founded by Dr. Horace Mann Bond of Lincoln University, Dr. Leo Hansberry of Howard University, and Etta Moton and William Steen, in 1953 served a significant role in promoting African interests in historically black institutions and advancing exchange opportunities. The AAI developed multilateral partnerships with the U.S. government, private foundations, and corporations to implement its African higher education and training programs and its educational outreach programs.[36]

The inexorable expansion of nationalist movements created opportunities for both the U.S. State Department and the USIA to initiate bilateral and multilateral aid to education. The Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (the Fulbright-Hays Act) established the legislative framework for programs designed to strengthen patterns of informal two-way communication in ways that would favorably influence relations between the United States and other countries. The expressed objective of this act consisted of "increasing mutual understanding, cooperation, and community by direct and indirect methods."[37] As the fourth dimension of U.S. foreign policy, educational and cultural exchange enabled the United States to disseminate national ideas, images, and representations in order to transmit overtly political values. Challenges from the USSR with regard to extending academic educational opportunities to Africans threatened to undermine U.S. objectives. The overtures of the USSR in this area accelerated the pace of development of U.S. educational and cultural exchange programs in Africa. The opening of Peoples' Friendship University (renamed Patrice Lumumba University in 1961) in Moscow in 1960, primarily as a university for foreign students in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, underscored the importance the USSR attached to attaining a dominant role in the education-training process. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams and U.S. State Department cultural affairs officers viewed the development of the USSR's programs as diametrically opposed to U.S. interests and they coordinated activities with the USIA to undermine Communist education. An effective counter to Soviet propaganda was to propagate printed media on racial discrimination in Soviet bloc countries.[38]

International and regional educational meetings on Africa, under the aegis of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and other UN agencies, provided the framework for the expansion of African and U.S. educational programs. The 1961 Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, laid the groundwork for wide-ranging programs of educational expansion. Similar conferences, such as the Tananarive Conference in 1961, stressed establishing a relationship with the Organization of African Unity's Educational and Cultural Commission. Cooperative programs with African governments and universities established a structure of mutual interdependency for undergraduate and graduate exchanges. Scholarship programs, such as the African Scholarship Program of American Universities (ASPAU) and the African Graduate Fellowship Program established by the AAI with funding from AID and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, underscored the increasing importance of coordinating private American ideological efforts with U.S. government programs in Africa.[39]

Increasing levels of bilateral and multilateral aid to education through private organizations like the African-American Institute, the Ford Foundation, and the Benjamin Rosenthal Fund expanded during the first half of the 1960s. In 1962. the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs allotted $4.7 million dollars to education grants and funding for educational exchange in Africa, an increase of 3,1 million over 1959. In previous years, under the Open Doors program, only a limited number of students from Africa studied in the United States, but increased funding for educational exchange led to an exponential increase in the number of students studying there. The early 1960s represented a significant watershed in the development of exchange programs in Africa. By 1963, 28,881 African students were enrolled in U.S. institutions, with the largest percentage enrolled at Howard University and the University of Southern California. In comparison, enrollment of African students in African universities increased from 18,000 to 21,000 during this same period.[40]

Cultural exchanges undergirded USIA efforts to take the offensive against Communist influence in Africa. In this context, the USIS "country team" played a pivotal role meshing the country programs of specific USIS posts with overall U.S. operations. Assisting and promoting foreign tours by American cultural groups in Africa served key political and psychological purposes. Cultural tours ostensibly aimed to express the desire of the United States for the peaceful evolution of African independence. These tours also putatively demonstrated the "ever-improving position" of African Americans in American society. African American entertainers stressed the bonds of mutual interest as they sought to achieve the agency's objective of promoting international understanding. Jazz artists such as the Wilbur de Paris Jazz Band, the Herbie Mann Jazz Band, and Louis Armstrong served as international "race artists" who performed at venues in Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, the Congo, Morocco, and Tunisia from 1956 to 1960. The "New Orleans" jazz played by the Wilbur de Paris Jazz Band featured original compositions with melodic improvisation that underscored a fusion of African and American instrumentation and intonation. African American theater groups from historically black colleges and universities, such as the Florida A&M Theater Group, which toured Nigeria and Uganda in 1958, provided added reinforcement to USIS country team objectives.[41]

The increased focus on educational and cultural exchange in Africa was consonant with the internationalization of civil rights issues. As a result, U.S. cultural policy during the 1960s witnessed a shift from "mutual understanding" to "political communication," which was characterized by an increase in the intensity of propaganda and information activities.[42] The USIA attempted to counter the influence of international criticism of civil rights abuses by sending American representatives abroad to promote positive race relations. From 1963 to 1964, American "ambassadors" of positive race relations traveled to several African nations to address social change in America and the democratic process. Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Thurgood Marshall and Berl I. Bernhard, staff director of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights traveled to several East African countries to discuss civil rights with African officials. Howard University Professor Dr. Raleigh Morgan discussed the civil rights movement in several West African countries in order to provide what Carl Rowan called "perspective" on the race issue in America.[43] Entertainer Gene Kelly during a four-week visit to Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Upper Volta, and Ghana symbolically displayed American progressivism through the medium of dance. In the sports arena, Boston Celtics basketball stars K. C. Jones and John Havlicek and San Francisco Warriors star Thomas Mecherry were among the sports figures chosen by the USIA to conduct sports clinics in five West African countries. Despite the implicit political connotations of these activities, the international exchange program, with few exceptions, failed to provide outright support for American policies but did serve, in the short term, to preserve neutrality in key African countries, including Mauritania, Senegal, Kenya, Chad, the Malagasy Republic (where the United States positioned its NASA tracking station), and Zambia.[44]

The civil rights and foreign policy nexus became the cornerstone of America's efforts to secure a position of influence on the African continent. Cultural diplomacy failed to prevent the deepening of the Cold War in Africa, particularly in Congo (Brazzaville) and southern Africa; however, it did serve as an effective instrument in promoting foreign awareness and knowledge of American society, culture, and values. As an integral part of the U.S. strategy to win "hearts and minds," cultural diplomacy through

VOA broadcasting, USIS publications, the English Language Teaching program, and the educational and cultural exchange programs had a profound impact on African perceptions of America. From an official policy perspective, the U.S. State Department in 1964 asserted that it had succeeded in containing the spread of Communism in Africa, since out of 35 independent African nations not one had adopted Communism. The overall Communist effort in Africa, however, was considerable. From 1954 to 1967, the USSR extended $900 million in economic aid and $300 million in military aid. In comparison, the PRC extended some $350 million in economic aid, stationed 6,000 technicians in key African states, and provided an undetermined amount in military assistance.[45] The concerns of both the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency regarding the influence of the USSR and the PRC in Africa persisted through the 1970s, primarily as a result of China's financing of the Tanzania-Zambia railroad. The co-linear relationship of the civil rights movement in America and the struggle for African independence during the early Cold War years moved Africa to the center of the bipolar conflict between East and West. The intensity of this conflict failed to create real "community" with African nations; however, cultural diplomacy served as an effective conduit for propagating American ideals, images, beliefs, and representations of American political values with the aim of enforcing American perceptions of truth and reality.[46]

Notes

1. "Lumumba Reverberations in Egypt," *United States Information Agency: A Commemoration* (USIA, 1999), p. 26, Box 25, Commemorative Books and Background Papers, MLR Entry A1–1064, General Records of the United States Information Agency (USIA), Historical Collection, Record Group (RG) 306, National Archives at College Park, Maryland (NACP); "How C.I.A. Put 'Instant Air Force' Into Congo to Carry Out United States Policy," April 26, 1966, *New York Times*; CIA Covert Operations, Agency History Program Subject Files 1926–75, MLR Entry A1–1072, Box 17, RG 306, NACP. For interviews with U.S. and UN officials during the Congo crisis, see the United Nations Oral History Collection Web site, www.un.org/Depts/dhl/dag/oralhist/htm. The author of this chapter would like to thank retired foreign service officers Richard Zorn and Ron Stewart for providing comments on an earlier version of this chapter. Several USIA public service officers disavow the use of the term "propaganda"; thus I distinguish between the different shades of propaganda and I note that black propaganda or complete disinformation was not a tool of the U.S. Information Agency.

2. Ibid.

3. Kevin V. Mulcahy, "Cultural Diplomacy: Foreign Policy and the Exchange Programs," pp. 270–92, Subject Files, MLR Entry A1–1066, RG 306, NACP.

4. Kelly Parker, "Josiah Royce," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Summer 2005 edition, ed., Edward N. Zalta, http:plato.stanford.edu/ archives/sum2005 /entries/ Royce/>. Charles Marsh and Ralph Luker's essays on King's theology establish the roots of the "Beloved Community" in the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel and Josiah Royce. See Ted Ownby's *The Role of Ideas in the Civil Rights South* (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2002), 25; and A. J. Ayer, *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Random House, 1984), 71–72. White and gray propaganda were the foundation of U.S. information programs. White propaganda refers to the dissemination of information that represents American perceptions of truth. Gray propaganda is in the middle of the spectrum between white and black. Gray propaganda distorts the truth but does not reach the threshold of complete disinformation.

5. See Walter Hixson's *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), which discusses the use of cultural tools in U.S. foreign policy; Nigel Gould-Davies, "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy," *Diplomatic History* 27, no. 2 (April 2003): 193–214, which provides a cogent argument for viewing cultural diplomacy as high politics; Robert E. Elder, *The Information Machine: The United States Information Agency and American Foreign Policy* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1968); and Edward Barret, *Truth Is Our Weapon* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1953).

6. Emily Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 4–5; Andrew J. Falk, "Reading between the Lines: Negotiating National Identity on American Television, 1945–1960," *Diplomatic History* 28, no. 2 (April 2004): 197–225; here: 208.

7. Mission Statements, 1945–67, Agency History Program Subject Files 1926–75, MLR Entry A1–1072, RG 306, NACP.

8. "The Place of Africa in U.S. Foreign Policy," *The Department of State during the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson*, vol. 4, November 1963–January 1969, 3–4, MLR Entry A1–5034, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, NACP. For a discussion of the "Beloved Community" within the SNCC, see Clayborne Carson's *In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).

9. "The Place of Africa in U.S. Foreign Policy," *The Department of State during the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson*, vol. 4, November 1963–January 1969, 3–4. MLR Entry A1–5034, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, NACP.

10. See Ownby, *The Role of Ideas*; Lewis Baldwin, *Toward the Beloved Community: Martin Luther King, Jr. and South Africa* (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1995); Martin Luther King, *Why We Can't Wait* (New York: New American Library, 2000), 1–38. Several scholars have examined race and Cold War politics in Africa during the 1960s. See, for example, James H. Meriwether, *Proudly We Can Be Africans: Black Americans and Africa, 1935–1961* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Gerald Horne, *From the Barrel of the Gun: The United States and the War against Zimbabwe* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1988* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Thomas Borstlemann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War* (New York: Oxford University

Press, 1993); Madeline G. Kalb, *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy* (New York: MacMillan Press, 1982).

11. U.S. Department of State, "Summary of Proposed Mutual Security Act of 1951," *Foreign Relations of the United States* (*FRUS*), 313–334, 1951, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1979).

12. Africa Program, Historical Background, 1970, Agency History Program Subject Files 1926–75, MLR Entry A1–1072, Box 9, RG 306, NACP. See Philip Snow, *The Star Raft: China's Encounter with Africa* (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988) for a historical overview of Chinese-African relations; and Alan Hutchinson, *China's African Revolution* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1975) for cogent analyses of China's economic interests in Africa; also see Laura Seay, "Misperception and Missed Opportunity: U.S. Policy and the Tanzania-Zambia Railway" (paper presented at the 2004 annual meeting of the African Studies Association, New Orleans).

13. Warren Weinstein and Thomas H. Henricksen, eds., *Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1980), 117–44; Alaba Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa, 1958–1971* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 61–111; The Gambia-China, 1966, Senegal-Soviet Bloc, 1966, CHICOMS, 1968, Subject Files Relating to The Gambia, Mali, and Senegal, 1965–73, MLR Entry A1–5683, Box 3, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of West African Affairs, RG 59, NACP.

14. "The Place of Africa in U.S. Foreign Policy," Nov. 1963–Jan. 1969.

15. Ibid., 57–58; Subject Files Relating to The Gambia, Mali, and Senegal, 1965–73, MLR Entry A1–5683, Box 3, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of West African Affairs, RG 59, NACP; Guidelines of U.S. Policy, Ghana: Guidelines for United States Policy and Operations, March 12, 1962, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of West African Affairs, Country Files, 1951–63, RG 59, NACP; "Memorandum from the Vice President's Military Aide (Burris) to Vice President Johnson, 31 January 1962," U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1961–1963*, vol. 21, *Africa*, 372; "Ghana: Assessment since Volta, June 13, 1962," *FRUS*, vol. 21, *Africa*, 375–77; "Memorandum of Conversation-African Unity and Guinean-American Relations," October 10, 1962, *FRUS*, vol. 21, *Africa*, 409–11.

16. "Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy, 1 December 1961," *FRUS 1961–1963*, vol. 21, *Africa*, 365–68; William Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1984), 12–13; Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Classified General Records, 1956–58, Ghana, Ghana's Delicate Balance, Red Chinese Visit Ghana, MLR Entry 2597-A, RG 84, NACP; Andrew DeRoche, "Kenneth Kaunda and the Johnson Administration" (paper presented at the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations conference, Austin, Texas, 2004).

17. Julius K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism: A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1965–1967* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 15; Guidelines of U.S. Policy, Ghana: Guidelines for United States Policy and Operations, March 12, 1962, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of West African Affairs, Country Files, 1951–63, RG 59, NACP.

18. Agency History Program Subject Files, Africa Program, Historical Background, 1970, MLR Entry A1–1072, Box 9, RG 306, NACP.

19. Ibid.

20. Roth, "Public Diplomacy and the Past: The Search for an American Style of Propaganda, 1952–1977," *The Fletcher Forum: A Journal of Studies in International Affairs* (Summer 1984): 368–369; "State of the Union Speech, January 9, 1958," *Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Washington, DC: Federal Register Division, 1958), 3. See Loyd Gardner's *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1949* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), which argues that the United States was responsible for the *way* in which the Cold War developed.

21. U.S. Department of State, *FRUS*, 1955–57, 522–23 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989). The Operations Coordinating Board was abolished by President Kennedy. Roth, "Public Diplomacy," 369.

22. American Visits to the Soviet Union: Vice Presidential Documents, July–August 1959, Bureau of European Affairs, Bilateral Political Relations Subject Files, 1921–73, File 1631 (g), MLR Entry A1–5345, Box 12, RG 59, NACP; See Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), which argues that the United States placed limits on independence and development in the Third World that might conflict with the interests of American capitalism.

23. See Michael L. Krenn, *Race and U.S. Foreign Policy during the Cold War* (New York: Garland Press, 1998); Michael L. Krenn, *Black Diplomacy: African Americans and the State Department, 1945–1969* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999); Mary Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative," *Stanford Law Review* 41 (November 1988): 80–93; Mary Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Thomas Borstlemann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Gerald Horne, *Black and Red: W.E.B. DuBois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War, 1944–1963* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1986); and W. E. B. DuBois, *The World and Africa* (New York: Viking Press, 1947).

24. "The Place of Africa in U.S. Foreign Policy."; For a discussion of U.S. historical and contemporary interests, see J. Forbes Munro, *Africa and the International Economy, 1800–1960* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1976); Henry F. Jackson, *From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Africa since 1960* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, *The United States and Africa: A History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

25. Worldwide Reactions to Racial Incidents in Alabama, Special ("S") Reports, 1953–63, RG 306, NACP; Borstlemann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*, 135–72; Cary Fraser, "Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock: The Eisenhower Administration and the Dilemma of Race in U.S. Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 233–64; Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights*.

26. Appropriations, 1954–74, Media Comment, Funding 1962–63, Subject Files, MLR Entry A1–1066, Box 9, RG 306, NACP.

27. Africa Program, Historical Background, 1970, Agency History Program Subject Files 1926–75, MLR Entry A1–1072, NACP.

28. Ibid. Although President Kennedy expressed a measure of goodwill toward both Africans and African Americans, Kenneth Janken has noted that Kennedy supported Portuguese colonialism and apartheid and branded members of liberation movements as "terrorists." See Janken, "Making Racial Change, Managing Radical

Change: The Civil Rights Movement, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Race Relations on the World Stage," *Diplomatic History* 27, no. 5 (November 2003): 713–23; here: 722.

29. Radio, Broadcasting to Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 1953–54, Broadcasting to Africa, 1954, Transmitting Stations, 1946–61, Subject Files, MLR Entry A1–1066, Box, 71, Box 88, RG 306, NACP; Africa Program, Historical Background, 1970, Agency History Program Subject Files, MLR Entry A1–1072, Box 9, RG 306, NACP; Facts about USIA, 1964, Communist Propaganda Expenditures, 1962, Agency History Program Subject Files, Box 16, RG 306, NACP.

30. USIS Centers, Africa 1954–91, Radio Program Schedules, 1963–64, Subject Files, MLR Entry A1–1066, Box 209, RG 306, NACP.

31. Radio Program Schedules, 1963–64, Subject Files, MLR Entry A1–1066, Box 109, RG 306, NACP.

32. Ronald Rubin, *The Objectives of the U.S. Information Agency: Controversies and Analysis* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966); 47–50; "An Era of Persuasion," Speeches, Carl T. Rowan, 1964, Agency History Program Subject Files, MLR Entry A1–1072, Box 13, RG 306, NACP.

33. Communist Broadcasting, 1963, USIA Reports Continued Rise in Communists Broadcasting, Communist International Broadcasting, 1966, Agency History Program Subject Files, MLR A1–1072, Box 16, Box 17, RG 306, NACP; Elder, *The Information Machine*, 6. The figures on Communist broadcasting are problematic. There are only 168 hours in a week. The figures may represent monthly totals, not biweekly totals.

34. English Language Teaching, Subject Files, MLR Entry A1–1066, Box 194, RG 306, NACP; "The Place of Africa in U.S. Foreign Policy"; USIA: English Language Teachers for Guinea, 1960, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of West African Affairs, Country Files, 1951–63, Guinea, RG 59, NACP; Gould-Davies, "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy," 193–214.

35. English Language Teaching, Subject Files, MLR Entry A1–1066, RG 306, NACP; USIA: English Language Teachers for Guinea, 1960, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of West African Affairs, Country Files, 1951–63, Guinea, RG 59, NACP; Guinea: Technical Cooperation Bilateral Agreement, 1959, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of West African Affairs, Country Files, 1951–63, U.S.-Guinean Relations, RG 59, NACP; The "Place of Africa in U.S. Foreign Policy"; Gould-Davies, "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy."

36. Margaret Y. Henderson and John P. Henderson, "The African Image of Higher Education in America," *International Educational and Cultural Exchange* (Spring 1967): 45–56, USIS Posts Publications, MLR Entry A1–1063, RG 306, NACP. See also Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Records Relating to Education and Educational Exchange, 1961–66, RG 59, NACP. Azikiwe attended Storer College in Harper's Ferry, West Virginia, and Lincoln University in Lincoln, Pennsylvania. Nkrumah attended Achimota College in Accra, Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, and the London School of Economics in England.

37. Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act, 1960–62, Agency History Program Subject Files, MLR Entry A1–1072, RG 306, NACP; Friendship University Moscow: The Student Trap, 1965, Propaganda Country Files, 1953–91, MLR Entry A1–1068, Box 1, RG 306, NACP; "The Place of Africa in U.S. Foreign Policy."

38. Educational and Cultural Programs in Africa—Private and Public, Records Relating to Education and Educational Exchange, 1961–66, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, MLR Entry A1–5700, RG 59, NACP.

39. Educational and Cultural Diplomacy, 1964, Subject Files, MLR A1–1066, RG 306, NACP; Raymond L. Perkins, "ASPAU in French Speaking West Africa," *International Educational and Cultural Exchange* (Fall 1965): 2–5, USIS Posts Publications, RG 306, NACP. The *Washington Post*, in "O What a Tangled Web the CIA Wove," February 26, 1967, identifies the African American Institute, the Ford Foundation, and the Benjamin Rosenthal Fund as recipients of CIA funds. For a discussion of the CIA and the cultural Cold War, see Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta Books, 1999).

40. The "Big Picture"—Basic Problems faced by the Department in Any Expansion of Our Educational Exchange Program in Africa, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, MLR Entry A1–5700, Records Relating to Education and Educational Exchange, 1961–66, RG 59, NACP; The Undergraduate Scholarship Program for African Students, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, MLR Entry A1–5700, Records Relating to Education and Educational Exchange, 1961–66, MLR Entry A1–5700, RG 59, NACP.

41. Ghana, Accra, Wilbur de Paris Jazz Band, Box 3, Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, RG 84, NACP; Educational and Cultural Programs in Africa—Private and Public, Records Relating to Education and Educational Exchange, 1961–66, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, RG 59, NACP; Exchange of Persons, Nigeria, Lagos Embassy, 1958, Classified General Records, 1956–63, RG 84, NACP; Elder, *The Information Machine*, 316–17.

42. Elder, *The Information Machine*, 42–43.

43. Speeches, Carl T. Rowan, 1964, Agency History Program Subject Files, MLR Entry A1–1072, RG 306, NACP; Exchange of Persons, Africa, 1960, African Students in the United States, Subject Files, MLR Entry A1–1066, RG 306, NACP; Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Records Relating to Education and Educational Exchange, 1961–66, MLR Entry 5700, RG 59, NACP.

44. Speeches, Carl T. Rowan, 1964, Agency History Program Subject Files, MLR Entry A1–1072, RG 306, NACP; Educational and Cultural Diplomacy, 1964, Subject Files, MLR Entry A1–1066, RG 306, NACP. For Soviet bloc interests in African athletics, see Classified Research Project Records, MLR Entry A1–1007-C, Requestor Only Reports, 1960, RG 306, NACP; Compilations of Cultural and Educational Exchanges between the Communist Countries and Africa, 1963, June 19 1964, Records Relating to Select USIA Programs, MLR Entry A1–1061, RG 306, NACP.

45. Subject Files, MLR Entry A1–1066, Educational and Cultural Diplomacy, 1964, RG 306, NACP; A Proposed US Policy toward Disaffection among Students from Developing Countries in the Soviet Bloc, May 24, 1963, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Records Relating to Education and Educational Exchange, 1961–66, MLR Entry A1–5700, RG 59, NACP; "The Place of Africa in U.S. Foreign Policy."

46. Three Years of Progress: The Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, 1961–63, Subject Files, MLR Entry A1–1066, RG 306, NACP; Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa*, 61–111, 180–240; "Intelligence Memorandum/1/ No. 1393/67, Some Aspects of Subversion in Africa, October 19, 1967," *FRUS 1964–1968*, vol. 24, *Africa*,

Document 230 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1999); Seay, "Misperception and Missed Opportunity"; "The Place of Africa in U.S. Foreign Policy." Thomas J. Noer notes that the appointment of Averell Harriman in 1964 as ambassador at large for overseeing U.S. African policy was a development that "foiled G. Mennen William's attempts to make Africa a major priority in U.S. foreign policy following President Kennedy's assassination." See Thomas J. Noer, "Phone Rage: LBJ, Averell Harriman, and G. Mennen Williams," *Passport: The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations* 35, no. 3 (2004): 42–43; see also Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams, Bureau of African Affairs, MLR Entry 1485, Administrative and Organization File, 1961, RG 59, NACP.

8

African Americans in Ghana and Their Contributions to "Nation Building" since 1985

Kwame Essien

Introduction

Dr. W. E. B. DuBois, in *The Souls of Black Folk*, writes about the opposition conflicts in black bodies: "Two souls, two thoughts, two unrecognized str ings, and two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alo keeps it from being torn asunder."[1] DuBois' representation of the intern struggle within black bodies gave returnees the courage they needed to co front their fear over their multiple natures: one nature claiming African ar American identity simultaneously; one accepting American citizenship b contemplating African citizenship at the same time; one embracir American cultural values and pondering African ethics at the same time; or feeling American and African all together; and most significantly, one livir in America but romanticizing the "Motherland." A return to Africa epit mizes DuBois' notion of double consciousness and the crisis of identity.[2]

DuBois himself satisfied the yearning to return to the motherland whe he left America in 1961 to take up Ghanaian citizenship. His home in Acc became a place of pilgrimage for black Americans and political activists wh traveled to Ghana. The burial site of DuBois is like a shrine in Ghana Historical symbols and discourses such as this continue to bolster relatio ships between diaspora blacks and Ghanaians in a variety of ways. The stud of African American history in Ghana encompasses a wide range of theme Returnees in Ghana and local people have expressed mutual cultural an economic interests.

In my attempt to analyze this complex relationship and Africa Americans' profound attraction to their ancestral homeland, I will look a the following distinct elements: the historical forces that have shape